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Debt Resistance: Beyond or Within Capitalism?
Abstract   The empirical cases of debt resistance show that the most coherent 
way of resisting debt consists mainly in debt cancelation or a jubilee. But is debt 
cancellation, even on a mass scale, a sufficient form of debt resistance or resistance 
should aim at a deeper restructuring of the economic system that creates in-
debtedness? The aim of this paper is to examine if it is possible to formulate an 
argument for debt resistance to a financial economy that creates debt, instead of 
becoming indebted and then calling for debt forgiveness, jubilee and cancellation. 
In order to arrive at such an argument, this paper analyzes firstly the arguments 
on debt resistance formulated by David Graeber in Debt: the First 5,000 Years 
and by Maurizio Lazzarato in The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the 
Neoliberal Condition, pointing to some common contradictions and shortcomings 
of Graeber’s and Lazzarato’s arguments which make debt foundational and inhibit 
the debt resistance instead of radicalizing it. The paper argues that an emphasis 
on the contingency and contestability of debt enhances resistance to debt and 
resistance to the neoliberal system as such.
Keywords: resistance, debt, neoliberalism, contingency, contestability
During the last two decades, waves of protests targeting capitalism and its 
neoliberal regime have been taking place around the world. The first wave 
of protests against neoliberal globalization, known as anti-globalization 
movements, included Zapatista’s struggles, Seattle 1999, Genoa 2001, Quebec 
City 2001, Porto Alegre 2002 and other protests, most of them taking place 
at the meetings of G8, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World 
Trade Organization and other corporations and trade agreements. The second 
wave of protests took place after 2008 financial crisis, including the Arab 
Spring, the Indignados in Spain, Greece and other EU countries protesting 
against austerity, unemployment and corrupt governments, and the Occupy 
movement, targeting financial elites, condemning rising inequality, austerity, 
and the general disempowerment of ‘the 99 percent’. Within these two cycles 
of protests, there was a targeting critique of contemporary capitalism and 
financial system, including debt and debt dependency mechanisms.
In the first cycle of protests, there was a broad constellation of struggles 
against paying ‘odious’ national debts to international banks (Pettitfor 2005). 
The most coherent and successful debt resistance within the alter-globaliza-
tion movement is considered Jubilee 2000 – an international coalition move-
ment in over 40 countries that called for cancellation of third world debt by 
the year 2000. The idea of jubilee derives from the biblical Year of Jubilee 
(as explained in Leviticus), that is, the year when those enslaved because of 
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debts are freed, and the lands lost because of debt are returned. The cam-
paign for Jubilee 2000 started in the earlier 1990, but the turning point was 
the demonstration at G8 meeting in Birmingham, UK, in 1998, of 70 000 
protesters from all over the world asking to put debt relief on the agenda of 
the Western governments. By the year 2000, the debt owed by 35 of the 
poorest countries was cancelled as the result of this campaign (Pettitfor 
2005). Later, Jubilee 2000 split into an array of organizations around the 
world carrying forward the debt campaign.1
The most articulated debt resistance movement from the post-2008 cycle of 
protests is Strike Debt! which emerged within the Occupy movement. In the 
final days of the Occupy, a campaign directed at student loans formalized 
their aim into a pledge: „I will stop paying off my student loan debt, if a 
million others will do the same“ (Caffentzis 2014). After several months of 
campaigning, only about 6000 debtors signed the pledge, even though there 
was estimated that were 7 million of invisible others who had defaulted on 
their student loan debts and legally faced problems from their defaulting 
(Caffentzis 2014). This situation posed the problem of how the invisible 
mass of debtors could transform themselves into visible agents. Strike Debt!2 
launched in 2012 aimed to bring about this self-transformation of invisible 
debtors into visible resistors. Its activity is channelled in two directions. The 
first is the researching, writing and distribution of The Debt Resistors’ 
Operations Manual, addressed to individuals, – „You are not a loan!“ – and 
intending to educate and empower them. The manual surveyed all circles 
of the ‘hell of debt’, from credit reporting agencies, to medical debt, house 
debt, car debt, student debt, to debt collection agencies, explaining the 
financial discourse in accessible terms and giving concrete advice how to 
live with debt and how to strike it. Another initiative of Strike Debt! is the 
Rolling Jubilee.3 Like the manual, the Rolling Jubilee exposes and undermines 
the ways that debt works: when a loan is in default, the bank that offered 
the loan is often willing to sell it on a secondary market for 2 to 5 cents on 
the dollar, and most often a collection agency is willing to buy the loan and 
to squeeze as much out of the defaulter as possible. So, the Rolling Jubilee 
raises funds from individual donors, many indebted themselves, to purchase 
defaulted debt and keep it out of the hands of collectors.
As we can see from these empirical cases, the most coherent way of resisting 
debt consists mainly in debt cancelation, that is, a jubilee. But is jubilee a 
sufficient form of debt resistance? Is debt cancellation, even on a mass scale, 
the only aim of debt resistance or it should aim at a deeper restructuring of 
the economic system that creates indebtedness?
1 http://jubileedebt.org.uk/
2 http://strikedebt.org/
3 http://rollingjubilee.org/
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Debt resistance as jubilee is an immemorial ritual: most of the popular insur-
rections in the past centuries have begun with the ritual destruction of the 
debt records-tablets: ‘Cancel the debts and redistribute the land!’ (Graeber 
2011: 8). Canceling debt and cleaning states was done since the pre-biblical 
times, but this did not prevent a new cycle of indebtedness. The idea of 
jubilee was incorporated as well in the invention of modern bankruptcy law 
(Mann 2009). The reformers of the day realised that the practice of imprison-
ing debtors was economically irrational, because it beggared debtors without 
significantly benefiting creditors. Once behind bars, a debtor had no means 
of resuming productive economic life, much less satisfying his debts. Thus, 
cancelling some debts was deemed economically efficient. For capitalism to 
proceed, it was necessary to shift the economic thinking and legal policy 
governing debt from moral questions to instrumental ones (Mann 2009). So, 
in bankruptcy, the debt cancelation is not done necessarily for the benefits 
of debtors, but mainly for creditors and for the sustainability of the system.
The question is then if it is possible to formulate an argument for debt 
resistance to a financial economy that creates debt, instead of becoming 
indebted and then calling for debt forgiveness, jubilee and cancellation. In 
order to arrive at such an argument, this paper will focus not on the analy-
sis of the empirical cases of debt, but on the conditions of possibility of debt 
resistance. The first two sections analyze the arguments on debt resistance 
formulated in two outstanding approaches: Debt: the First 5,000 Years (2011) 
by David Graeber, and The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the 
Neoliberal Condition (2012) by Maurizio Lazzarato. The third section points 
to some common contradictions and shortcomings of Graeber’s and Laz-
zarato’s arguments which make debt foundational and inhibit debt resistance 
instead of radicalizing it. An emphasis on the contingency and contestabil-
ity of debt within the frameworks elaborated by Graeber and Lazzarato 
enhances resistance to debt and to the neoliberal system as such.
I. Resisting debt: Graeber’s perspective
The hidden story of debt
The aim of Graeber’s Debt is to dismantle the claim ‘One always has to pay 
his debts’ as a ‘moral confusion’ and ‘flagrant lie’(Graeber 2011: 391), and 
this sounds as an unmistakable call for debt resistance. The rich argumenta-
tion and illustration with anthropological and historical data cannot be 
resumed here. The aim of this reading is only to see how Graeber’s approach 
enables resistance to debt.
Graber deconstructs two ‘founding myths’, which are as well two ways of 
thinking debt: the myth of barter and the myth of primordiality of debt. 
According to an idealized view of archaic communities, before money systems 
developed, people exchanged goods and services in their own interests. As 
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societies became more complex, barter required multilateral transactions 
to ensure the distribution of a larger number of goods. To simplify the ex-
change process, a neutral and consensual form of exchange was required, 
and in this way money was born. Graeber argues that this is a myth and 
ethnographers have not found any example of a pure barter economy. The 
myth of barter was crucial to the founding of economics as a discipline by 
Adam Smith, who conceived it, on a par with Newtonian physics, as a uni-
verse that functions according to the laws of spontaneous and effective free 
market. In this founding story, debt is abolished from the picture (Graeber 
2011: 21–43). According to the ‘primordial debt’ theories, the community 
promotes an increasing sense of indebtedness to one’s forebears that inten-
sifies over time, until at last one’s ancestors are elevated to the status of gods. 
Human activities become attempts to reduce the sense of debt, the most 
promising being the sacrificial rituals. Later, as history moved forward, 
governments start to tax populations because they were able to appropriate 
the role of guardianship of universal debt. Again, according to Graeber, there 
is insufficient anthropological evidence to support primordial debt theory, 
and it is just a backward projection based on a notion of debt that is only 
made possible with the advent of the modern conception of state, society 
and of societal „duty“, and so on (Graeber 2011: 69). In this context, Graeber 
reads Nietzsche’s description of debt from Genealogy of Morals as a game 
„starting out from ordinary bourgeois assumptions and driving them to a 
place where they can only shock a bourgeois audience“ (Graeber 2011: 79). 
Without doing justice to Nietzsche’s essay, Graeber says that „It’s a worthy 
game“, but one „played entirely within the confines of bourgeois thought“ 
(Graeber 2011: 79). These two myths are for Graeber, „two sides of the same 
coin... It’s only once we can imagine human life as a series of commercial 
transactions that we’re capable of seeing our relation to the universe in terms 
of debt (Graeber 2011: 75).
None of these myths offers a credible explanation and Graeber proposes 
another way of looking at debt. Graeber maps ‘three moral grounds of eco-
nomic relations’: communism, hierarchy, and exchange. Communism is „the 
foundation of all human sociability“, „a recognition of our ultimate inter-
dependence“, a „baseline communism“ (Graeber 2011: 95–98), as in the 
situation when one needs to figure out how to get somewhere and the 
other knows the way. Hierarchy involves at least two parts, where one part 
is considered superior to another, and operates by one side generosity, and 
Graeber illustrates the logic of hierarchy with stories of kings (giving a 
candy to a child also illustrates it). Exchange is all about equivalence: „It’s 
a back-and-forth process involving two sides in which each side gives as 
good as it gets“ (Graeber 2011: 103). The birth of debt takes place in an 
exchange: „A debt is an exchange that has not been brought to completion“ 
(Graeber 2011: 121). Thus, debt presupposes the existence of two free and 
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equal parties. A debt only exists when the debtor is considered able to repay. 
During the time that the debt remains unpaid, the logic of hierarchy takes 
hold. The lack of reciprocity between former equals makes situations of 
unpayable debt difficult and painful: „Since creditor and debtor are ulti-
mately equals, if the debtor cannot do what it takes to restore herself to 
equality, there is obviously something wrong with her; it must be her fault“ 
(Graeber 2011: 121).
In this broken by debt exchange money are born as social currency, that is, 
money that acts ‘to create, maintain, or sever relations between people rather 
than to purchase things’, ‘a way of recognizing the existence of debts that 
cannot possibly be paid’; ‘as a substitute for life’ (Graeber 2011: 159), like 
money presented to the family of a murdered victim so as to prevent a revenge. 
Social currency functions in ‘human economies’, in which human beings are 
„each in a unique nexus of relations“, where „no one could ever be considered 
exactly equivalent to anything or anyone else“ (Graeber 2011: 208).
Money, as token of recognition that one cannot pay a debt, turn into a form 
of payment by which a debt can be extinguished once human economies are 
taken over by commercial ones. To make a person equivalent, for example, 
to a bar of camwood, it takes „an enormous amount of sustained and system-
atic violence“ (Graeber 2011: 160). The growth of a „military–coinage–slave 
complex“ enforced the mercenary armies that cut human beings from their 
social context to work as slaves. The extreme violence led to the rise of great 
empires, the advent of large-scale slavery and the use of coins to pay soldiers. 
As well, the advent of obligation to pay taxes with money required people to 
engage in monetary transactions, which increased debt and slavery. From 
this perspective, Graeber tells the history from around 800 BC to the con-
temporary neoliberalism, showing a „great embarrassing fact that haunts all 
attempts to represent the market as the highest form of human freedom: that 
historically, impersonal commercial markets originated in debt“ (Graeber 
2011: 386). How liberating is this history of debt? How does Graeber’s 
argument empower resistance to debt and to the neoliberal system as such?
A call for jubilee and its limits
Graeber does not aim to construct an agent of resistance to debt, however 
his approach aims explicitly to empower debt resistance. In the last chapter, 
„1971– the Beginning of Something Yet to Be Determined“, Graeber de-
scribes the ascendency of debt in neoliberalism as result of history and as 
an exacerbation of the logic of debt and violence. Thus, the new global cur-
rency is rooted in military power even more firmly than the old was. As well, 
debt peonage continues to be the main principle of recruiting labour globally. 
Further, institutions like IMF, World Bank, and the WTO, similar to the divine 
kings of the ancient Middle East or the religious authorities of the Middle 
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Ages, have not been created to protect debtors, but to enforce the rights of 
creditors. US is a „catastrophic illness“ since borrowing is simply a matter 
of survival.
„We have to begin to free ourselves“, maintains Graeber, and „the first thing 
we need to do is to see ourselves again as historical actors, as people who 
can make a difference in the course of world events“ (Graeber 2011: 383). 
Graeber’s history of debt can indeed be a beginning for freeing ourselves 
from debt. It is liberating to find out that money and debt have „no essence“, 
these are always human arrangements and a matter of political contention. 
It allows us to question the „sacred“ principle that we must all pay our debts. 
Thus, Graeber calls for a „Biblical-style“ Jubilee: „one that would affect both 
international debt and consumer debt… Nothing would be more important 
than to wipe the slate clean for everyone, mark a break with our accustomed 
morality, and start again“ (Graeber 2011: 390–391).
Not paying all our debts is only a half of the change and liberation – ‘new 
ideas’ and alternatives are needed, which will not emerge without jettisoning 
our accustomed categories of thought. Graeber tries himself to jettison 
one – the postulate of the „industrious poor“ who needs access to debt to 
rise out of poverty, which is the keystone for the arguments on democratizing 
debt by channeling the financial flows and credit networks to the „in-
dustrious poor“. This view not only concerns the poverty of some people, 
those who are industrious and do not deserve to be poor, but also is based 
on the underlying assumption that work is by definition virtuous, since 
the ultimate measure of humanity’s success is its ability „to increase the 
overall global output of goods and services by at least 5 percent per year“ 
(Graeber 2011: 390). According to Graber, if humans continue along these 
lines, they will to destroy everything. The question now is how to move 
toward a society where people „can live more by working less“, so Graeber 
puts a good word for the non-industrious poor: „At least they aren’t hurting 
anyone“ (Graeber 2011: 390).
However, how can one resist the logic of debt that functioned so fiercely for 
5000 years? From where will the potential resisters take their strength or 
inspiration to jettison old categories of thought? Although this ‘real’ but 
‘hidden’ history of debt brings new insights and can empower resistance to 
debt, there are some methodological aspects of Graeber’s approach that 
might impede resistance.
Looking for an alternative history of debt, Graeber constructs a meta-nar-
rative. The general objection to grands recits is that although there will always 
be a multiplicity of rival stories that could equally well be told, these will 
have to be suppressed in the name of safeguarding the meta-narrative, this 
is why grand narratives are considered oppressive (Lyotard 1984). Graber’s 
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alternative history of money and market is not immune to this objection, – it 
supresses, for example, the story of market that brought some well-being to 
humans. Graeber’s history of debt ignores this possible criticism as if there 
is an urgent necessity to write a grand narrative of debt, as grand as the 
dominant story it opposes. The story told is a counter-story aiming to dis-
mantle and unmask the mainstream narrative of debt (and of money, finance, 
market, capitalism):
New ideas won’t emerge without the jettisoning of much of our accus-
tomed categories of thought – which have become mostly sheer dead 
weight, if not intrinsic parts of the very apparatus of hopelessness – and 
formulating new ones. This is why I spent so much of this book talking 
about the market, but also about the false choice between state and market 
that so monopolized political ideology for the last centuries that it made 
it difficult to argue about anything else. The real history of markets is 
nothing like what we’re taught to think it is (Graeber 2011: 385).
This statement has all the ingredients of the „false consciousness – ideology 
critique„ approach: „accustomed categories of thought“, „false choice between 
state and market“, „monopolized political ideology“, „real history of market“. 
The dismantling of the idea of growth – „at least 5 percent per year“ – as 
destroying everything is a way of saying that the population and capitalist 
system in general hold desires that are contrary to their own interests, and 
this is an essential feature of false consciousness (Pines 1993; Cooke 2006). 
The rejection of the two myths of origins is as well an unveiling of the mys-
tification in the founding of the market and the science of economy. So, the 
resistance to debt is expected to come from the unveiling of false conscious-
ness, as though once this false belief about debt (and market) is brought to 
consciousness, the debtor will see how absurd and harmful it is, and will act 
and think anew, as though the „real“ story of debt will illuminate the debtor’s 
mind, and he will liberate himself from the trap of the debt and will overturn 
the system. What is wrong with this ‘false consciousness’ approach of debt?
False consciousness, a concept originally developed by Marx and Engels, was 
used by various political thinkers to explain the actions and behaviour of 
different members of society, but mainly of those from lower or subordinate 
classes (Pines 1993). The concept has attracted an array of critiques that have 
severely affected false consciousness’ legitimacy, value, and explanatory 
adequacy. The concept was associated with totalitarian political regimes; in 
addition, the idea that all our beliefs and values are the products of socially 
constructed regimes of truth renders talk of true and false consciousness 
essentially meaningless (Celikates 2006; Cooke 2006). If false consciousness 
and ideology critique are used in the „real“ history of debt, then in order to 
increase their credibility as concepts and methods, they have to be defended 
anew. Otherwise, there is something misleading in the access to the „real“ 
but hidden history of market, which structures our everyday life, but is 
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intangible and inaccessible for the most of us, and which only reveals its con-
ditions of possibility only when „theory and militancy have managed to crack 
into the notorious ‘hidden abode’“ (Toscano 2014). The elitism of this approach 
hardly enhances debt resistance, neither from below nor from above.
There are other aspects in this „real“ story of debt that might undermine its 
emancipatory potential. The transition from human to commercial economies 
sounds deterministic. The „human economy“, containing already the seeds 
for more or less violent exchange, is nevertheless an economy, and the fact 
that it degenerates in commercial economies appear unavoidable. There is 
no guaranty that human economies will not degenerate again if restored, 
let say, in a community of non-industrious poor where every person is in a 
unique set of relationships. Another deterministic aspect of this grand nar-
rative of debt relates to the three moral grounds of economic relation – com-
munism, hierarchy and exchanges – which are very unequal in their capacity 
to determine the course of events. Exchange becomes the dominant ground 
– it is the origin of debt, debt is the origins of money and market, thus, of 
all violence that follows. Exchange takes priority without being balanced by 
communism and hierarchy, which remain in the background as secondary 
grounds. As well, the „real“ story of debt does not resist the retroactive in-
terpretation of debt that it is devoted to overturn and does not escape the 
primordiality of debt thesis that is rejected (Wortham 2013; Toscano 2014). 
In the „real“ story of market and money, debt is the ground of all human 
activity, the basis of social, economic and political life. The humans from 
different anthropological contexts are portrayed as immersed in debt; debt, 
as an incomplete exchange, determining most of their actions. If debt is 
everywhere and everyone is in debt in a human community, then how can one 
resist to debt and indebtedness? Stressing the pervasiveness and ubiquity 
of debt, instead of leading to resistance, can have the adverse effect of „doing 
nothing“ – even IFM economists recognize that „A radical solution for high 
debt is to do nothing at all – just live with it“ (Ostry, Ghosh, and Espinoza 
2015). „Doing nothing“ could „qualify“ as resistance to debt dependency 
mechanism, and concomitantly „do nothing“ has to be a liberation from debt 
and a source of a new ideas.
II. Resisting debt: Lazzarato’s perspective
The ascendance of debt and the indebted man
Lazzarato’s ground-breaking approach of the neoliberal condition is based 
on two hypotheses. The first is that the paradigm and the archetype of the 
social lies not in exchange but in credit. There is no equality of exchange 
underlying social relations, but rather an asymmetry of debt/credit. The 
second hypothesis is that debt represents an economic relationship in-
separable from the production of the debtor subjectivity, since debt is an 
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economic relation which, in order to exist, implies the molding and control 
of subjectivity. Thus, credit and debt and the creditor-debtor relationship 
constitute „specific relations of power that entail specific forms of production 
and control of subjectivity – a particular form of homo economicus, the 
„indebted man“ (Lazzarato 2012: 30).
The concept of the ‘indebted man’ itself is indebted to Nietzsche, Marx, 
Foucault, Deleuze & Guattari. This genealogy gives a philosophical expla-
nation of neoliberalism in terms of specific temporality, subjectivity, and 
existence as such. By asking the governed to promise, that is, to honour their 
debt, neoliberalism exercises „control over the future“, since debt obligations 
allow one to calculate, measure, and establish equivalences between current 
and future behaviour. By this, debt neutralizes time as creation of new pos-
sibilities: „the strange sensation of living in a society without time, without 
possibility, without foreseeable rupture, is debt“ (Lazzarato 2012: 46). The 
genealogy of debt reveals that the creditor-debtor relationship is also an 
ethics, since it presupposes an ethico-political process of constructing a 
subjectivity endowed with a memory, a conscience, and a morality that 
forces the debt to be guarantor of self, both accountable and guilty. In the 
neoliberal condition, this ethical process overlaps with the neoliberal im-
perative to become „human capital“ and „entrepreneur of the self“ (Foucault 
2008). Thus, credit exploits not only social relationships in general, but 
also the uniqueness of existence. The moral judgment on the capacity to pay 
debts or to make use of yourself as a human capital concerns with the 
choices one makes, with existence and its meaning.
Describing the ascendency of debt, Lazzarato argues that the picture of 
neoliberalism today is different from the one announced by the new econ-
omy of the 1980s and 1990s. The motto of neoliberalism „governing as little as 
possible“ gave way to even more authoritarian politics. The governmentality 
is now „governance by debt“ (Lazzarato 2014). The sovereign power of the 
state is neutralized because monetary sovereignty, that is, the power of de-
struction/creation of money is reconfigured. Ratings agencies, financial in-
vestors, and institutions like IMF place financial constraints on state sovereign 
power, undermining it.
Neoliberal condition makes visible three types of debt: private, sovereign, 
and social debt. The private debt through bank loans has now a striking rise 
in the importance for debt-economy. The sovereign or public debt appeared 
since the 1970s, when most states have abdicated control over their central 
banks, which means they can no longer decide to print more money to pay 
for government expenses and so they have to borrow on financial markets 
to fund these costs. Lazzarato introduces the notion of „social debt“ to con-
nect private and public debt, and to stresses that public actors and private 
institutions externalize their risks to the population. For example, when a 
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state installs a welfare system, the debts to fund this system are ultimately 
referred back to the population. When a state experiences difficulties in 
funding the welfare system, the austerity measures are supported as well 
by the population. Social rights (unemployment insurance, the minimum 
wage, healthcare, etc.) are transformed into social debt, and beneficiaries 
into debtors whose repayment means adopting prescribed behaviour. Also, 
private debts by banks and large companies can be externalized in the form 
of social debts. When a bank is „too big to fail“ it is saved through the use of 
public money to nationalize their losses: „in a cynical turn, the costs of 
re-establishing this relation of exploitation and domination will have to be 
paid for by its victims“ (2012: 115).
The ascendency of neoliberalism enforces debt subjectivity in new ways. 
Apart from „social subjection“ that controls the subject through the mobili-
zation of his conscience, memory, and representations, there is „machinic 
subjugation“ with an infra-personal and pre-individual hold on subjectivity 
that does not pass through reflexive consciousness or through the self (Laz-
zarato 2012: 146). Lazzarato explores Deleuze’s account on the machine as 
activating the „dividual“ not the individual. „Individuals become ‘dividuals,’ 
and masses become samples, data, markets or banks“ (Lazzarato 2012: 148). 
The credit card is such an apparatus in which the dividual functions like a 
human element that conforms to the „non-human“ elements of the socio-
technical machine constituted by the banking network. The machinic en-
slavement facilitates a generalized form of exploitation, depoliticizes and 
depersonalizes it (Lazzarato 2014).
Thus, in neoliberalism, debt functions as a primary instrument of power 
over population’s life, social rights are transformed into social debts, exploi-
tation is expanded extensively. Then, how is resistance possible?
Can the indebted man resit debt?
The aim of The Making of the Indebted Man is „to venture into enemy terri-
tory to analyze the debt economy and the production of indebted man in 
order to construct the theoretical weapons for the struggles to come“ (Laz-
zarato 2012: 33). However, the construction of the weapons for struggles 
is not an easy process, because debt responsibilizes people as individuals 
and undermines the capacity and conditions for collective political resistance: 
„The objectives of the debt economy are thoroughly political: the neutraliza-
tion of collective attitudes (mutualisation, solidarity, cooperation, rights for 
all, etc.) and the memory of the collective struggles“ (2012: 114). The 
framework of entrepreneurship of the self, combined with individualized 
private debt and debt management, limits the realm of collective and 
democratic action. As well, debt eliminates the politics of „panels“ of citizens, 
experts and counter-experts, etc. Intending to „govern as little as possible“, 
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neoliberalism ends by ruling and controlling as much as possible with „as 
little democracy as possible“ (Lazzarato 2012: 160). In this way, Lazzarato’s 
analysis creates a horizon of expectation of some powerful and radical 
weapons for struggling with debt „power bloc“. Thus, how the indebted man 
can resist debt? What are his weapons for the struggles to come?
Despite the individualisation of debt and responsibility, the resistance to 
debt has to be a collective action from below. The „mainspring of opposition“ 
to debt politics cannot come to self-awareness of the debt power bloc that 
led to the catastrophe: „‘Awareness’ must be imposed on the institutions and 
structures of government through a struggle from below“ (Lazzarato 2012: 
156). The struggle from below is expected to have a large social support, 
because debt surpasses the divisions between employment and unemploy-
ment, working and non-working, productive and assisted, precarious and 
non-precarious, thus the figure of indebted man calls for „new solidarities“ 
and „new cooperation“ (Lazzarato 2012: 156–157).
Another condition for the struggle against debt power is to organize it beyond 
the border of the nation-state, at the level of Capital as „Universal Creditor“ 
(Lazzarato 2012: 162). Even if people would manage to organize a collective 
revolt within the nation state, the state will have to reassure to the global 
financial institutions, rating agencies and financial market that the sovereign 
debts will be paid. Debt ignores boundaries and nationalities, it knows only 
creditors and debtors, so the struggle against debt appears as a cosmopolitan 
struggle against the unjust globalization of debt and finance.
Further, the struggle against debt has to traverse not only the borders of the 
nation state, but to reinvent democracy as traversing and reconfiguring the 
political, the social, and the economic – fields that political theories con-
tinue to conceive of separately, although debt has already united them 
within a „single apparatus“. The debt economy controls the social, eco-
nomic and political spheres, this is an essential condition for governing by 
debt, so the struggle against debt has to unites all of them. The envisaged 
struggle is not only a resistance to debt but the „essence“ of political strug-
gle, that cannot be otherwise „except from within and against the politics 
of Capital“ (Lazzarato 2012: 163). Capital creates the current domination, 
therefore the conditions for dispute are here: „The negative that debt insti-
tutes informs the historical conditions from which struggle turns away to 
invent new forms of subjectivation and new possibilities of life. Still, these 
conditions are indeed, at each instance, historical, unique, and specific. And 
today they come together in debt“ (Lazzarato 2012: 163).
One more condition of resistance is deemed necessary. Because the debt 
economy is endowed with a paradigm of subjectivity, the struggle against 
the debt economy is as well against its morality of guilt and fear, which re-
quires a „specific kind of subjective conversion“ and „second innocence“ 
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with respect to debt, „leaving behind debt morality and the discourse in 
which it holds us hostage“ (Lazzarato 2012: 164). The Nietzscheian inspired 
„conversion“ and „second innocence“ appear as part of the „theoretical 
weapons for the struggle to come“.
The approach of the indebted man creates a horizon of expectation of 
radical and powerful theoretical weapons for struggle. Is this horizon of 
expectation met? Does Lazzarato provide sufficient theoretical support for 
resistance to debt? Can the indebted man resist debt? Lazzarato’s account 
of the indebted man is a necessary and timely approach of the necessity of 
resistance to new forms of power. However, there are several aspects limiting 
debt resistance, which have to be examined.
The question why people accept debt economy and their own exploitation 
instead of resisting it cannot be addressed to the indebted man, as portrayed 
by Lazzarato. The indebted man appears as being under the veil of „false 
consciousness“, unaware of the exploitation and of his indebted condition. 
Lazzarato argues explicitly that the logic of capital is an open process, not 
a mystifying one: „The power of capitalism, like the world it aims to appro-
priate and control, is always in the process of being made“ (Lazzarato 2012: 
107). Simultaneously but implicitly, he proceeds as though there is still a 
logic of capital working behind the scenes and the task of the critic is to 
unveil this logic. He unmasks one aspect of liberalism after another, such as 
the contract as an agreement between free and equal individuals, central 
bank independence, the reduction of work to employment, the machining 
subjugation, etc. A similar unmasking is his recent book Gouverner par la 
dette arguing that (neo)liberalism has never been liberal, but state capitalism 
(Lazzarato 2015). This unmasking of the logic of financial debt can have 
indeed an emancipatory and empowering potential. The field of finance has 
always been postulated as requiring expert knowledge and the population was 
unaware of the ways that finance works – the The Debt Resistors’ Operations 
Manual presented at the beginning of this paper intends exactly to explain 
to debtors how finance and debt operate. False consciousness and ideology 
critique might have an emancipatory role here, but these are not assumed 
as a methodological strategy by Lazzarato. Without defending anew the 
credibility of this method, the implicit critique of ideology is prone to in-
numerable criticism such as elitism, authoritarianism, un-verifiability (Cooke 
2006, Celikates 2006).
Another aspect that can impede resistance is a totalising and overdetermined 
neoliberal condition. Although the aim is „not to offer a new totalizing 
theory of neoliberalism, but rather to prepare the groundwork for a re-ex-
amination of the current transformations affecting Western societies through 
the debt economy“ (Lazzarato 2012: 35), the concept of the indebted man 
and „debt subjectivity“ appear in a kind of complicity with neoliberalism, 
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enriching and refining its theses, effects, impact. Neoliberalism permeates 
all spheres of life and society, and this reminds a totalizing picture of society, 
where, according to Claude Lefort, „a condensation takes place between the 
sphere of power, the sphere of law and the sphere of knowledge“ (Lefort 
1988:13). The intensification of the debt-economy in neoliberalism is an 
empirical and statistical fact, however, Lazzarato’s approach leads to a 
„philosophical over-determination of neoliberalism“ (Toscano 2014), through 
philosophically grounded debt and by equating it with a paradigm of sub-
jectivity. As well, the call for transversally ontologizes the capital. Although 
the aim is „to offer a transversal point of view from which struggles might 
begin“ (Lazzarato 2012: 164), the capital becomes the „real“ dimension and 
the „essence“ of the economic, the social and the political, without contra-
dictions, contingency or indeterminacy. However, if we accept the portrait 
of the indebted man and the resulting theory of neoliberalism, then we risk 
eliminating any kind of critical distance towards neoliberalism as a crucial 
condition for resistance to debt.
Further, the indebted man is trapped in a methodological asymmetry of 
Lazzarato’s approach. The indebted man is firstly postulated a passive matter 
who is transformed into a subject by debt, social subjection and machinic 
subjugation, and afterwards the aim of the argument is to discover the 
revolutionary subject as free to subvert the existing forms of subjectivation. 
From where does this capacity to react as a subject free from the constraints 
of debt come from? How can a theory simultaneously postulate the production 
of subjectivity and to look for an agency that is able to break with it and with 
dominant meanings? The solution sounds like deus ex machina. It is not 
surprisingly then, that Lazzarato sees the possibility of resistance in „subjective 
conversion“ and „second innocence“:
The fight against the debt economy and above all against its „morality“ of 
guilt, which, in the end, is a morality of fear, also requires a specific kind 
of subjective conversion…The resumption of the class struggle in the right 
place, that is, where it is the most effective, must recapture this „second 
innocence“ with respect to debt… leaving behind debt morality and the 
discourse in which it holds us hostage (Lazzarato 2012: 164).
How is conversion of the indebted man to a debt free subjectivity possible? 
What kind of transformative experience is this? Probably, as all conversions, 
this one is unpredictable and „ineffable“. Nevertheless, conversion ad-
dresses a real predicament of debt resistance. The authority against whom 
the debt resistance has to be directed is more anonymous and ambivalent 
than the traditional power exercised by state (Balibar 2013). And this makes 
it rather difficult to establish what exactly has to be resisted and targeted 
first: the banks, the financial system, the whole way of life? If everything is 
financialised (education, health, social security, life in general) and the 
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potential resistors are part of the system to which they (have to) oppose, so 
what has to be questioned and resisted first is the whole way of life. Resisting 
a whole way of life inoculated by finance and debt economy can indeed 
amount to a „conversion“ to a debt free subjectivity. But no „theoretical 
weapons“ for this conversion are provided. „Conversion“ and „second in-
nocence“ are mentioned only once, in Conclusions, as true deus ex-machina 
type of solutions for resistance to debt. Lazzarato hopes that resistance to 
debt and debt inducing subjectivity is possible, that man, although indebted, 
will create new forms of subjectivity, for example by refusing to work, and 
finding non-exploitative, classless communities (Lazzarato 2014). This re-
sistance can indeed take place, but this will be a practice of resistance, 
without justification in theory. On the theoretical level, the question from 
where comes this capacity to resist remains without answer.
III. Contingency and contestability of debt
Graeber and Lazzarato’s books do not communicate directly and are elabo-
rated from different perspectives: one deals with history of debt, another 
with subjectivity of debt in the neoliberal condition. Nevertheless, they 
complement each other, as though Lazzarato’s book develops in depth the 
last chapter of Graeber’s history „1970 – The Beginning of Something Yet to 
Be Determined“, because only a debt imposed by violence through centuries 
can lead to a total subjugation by debt nowadays. As well, both approaches 
aim to empower/enhance resistance to debt, and both keep unmasking the 
logic of debt, market and capital. The liberating and emancipatory potential 
of both approaches could arise indeed from dismantling the „false con-
sciousness“ of debt through ideology critique. It can be liberating to see that 
debt is not only a matter of exact neutral mathematical calculation but an 
effect of violence and asymmetry of power, but the authors do not elaborate 
on the emancipatory potential of ideology critique for debt resistance.
The liberatory potentially of both approaches is shadowed by the anthropo-
logical and philosophical overdetermination of debt, both making the debt 
foundational, the archetype and ground of social relations, the source of 
money and of all economic and social transaction. Viewing debt as founda-
tional has an inhibiting effect for creating a theoretical model of agency 
resisting to debt, because it eliminates any critical distance towards debt 
economy. The condition of resistance to the mechanisms of indebtedness 
can be enhanced if debt is not posited as an archetype and paradigm of the 
social, but as a necessarily contingent ground. The argument for the rest of 
this paper is that debt is contingent, and the contingency of debt enhances 
debt resistance by allowing a permanent contestability of debt.
What is contingency then? In order that there be genuine contingency, there 
must be no reason for anything to be or to remain the way that it is: „everything 
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must be able, without reason, to be other than it is; everything must, without 
reason, be able not to be and/or be able to be other than it is“ (Meillassoux 
2010: 60). Contingency is part of our intellectual horizon marked by an 
increased „awareness of contingency“ (Marchart 2007: 26). The increasing 
awareness of contingency is part of the process of a slow but constant „dis-
solution of the markers of certainty“ (Lefort 1987: 17) that happens in 
modernity. Contingency has always been hidden within the shadow of ne-
cessity and universality and it has often been underestimated or even over-
looked in modern philosophies. For example, Richard Rorty has given 
prominence to the active role of contingency, analysing three kinds of con-
tingency, that is, the contingency of language, that of selfhood, and that of 
a liberal community (Rorty 1989). In the last decades contingency moves 
away from the traditional logical notion of the contingent as that which 
could be otherwise to the much stronger notion of „necessary contingency“ 
(Marchart 2007; Meillassoux 2010). Thus, with this minimal specification 
of what is contingency, the assumption of the paper is that debt is contingent 
in three ways: as a fact, as a normative claim and as a ground.
Contingency of debt as a fact: When something is said to be contingent, it 
may be accidental, conditional, uncertain or indeterminate. When applied 
to facts and events, contingency means that they are somehow accidental, 
random, and not necessary. Debt as an empirical fact is contingent for obvious 
empirical reasons. At the level of private debt, not everyone is indebted with 
a personal/household debt, for several reasons which are again obvious and 
well known. First, one has to qualify for a debt. A potential debtor has already 
be a guarantor of its capacity to pay back, before receiving a loan, so not all 
of the more or less industrious poor can receive a loan, in spite of the attempt 
to democratise debt and to channel the capital to diverse categories of poor. 
Second, at the level of private debt, some might not need a debt, be these 
the privileged from the „1%“, but also some categories who might not feel 
forced to borrow, because one does not normally view a bank loan as forced 
on the debtor. Third, debt as a contingent fact means as well that one has 
been indebted and payed his debts, as Graeber himself affirms that he paid 
his student loans (Graeber 2011: 389).
Contingency characterizes as well social and sovereign debt as empirical 
facts. Social debt, defined by Lazzarato, has to take into account the geo-
graphical contingency. Social debt might be the lived reality of the French 
beneficiary of welfare policies, but is it less relevant for some Asian states, 
for example, or for other countries that do not have a tradition of welfare 
state. As well, the indebted condition might be the lived reality of US or some 
EU countries, but it is far from the predominant social relation in other 
countries. Without taking into consideration the geographical contingency 
of debt, Lazzarato’s thesis, namely that indebtedness is the primary social 
relation under neoliberalism, could be rather Eurocentric (Slothuus 2013).
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Theoretisations of sovereign debt have to take into consideration its contin-
gency as well, at least the most obvious one: sovereign debt does not confirm 
the asymmetry of power attributed to creditor-debtor relationship. The states 
with the heaviest sovereign debts are not the weakest in terms of economy, 
military, or political power, as is the emblematic case of the US foreign debt. 
Control exercised by financial operators on the sovereign operations of any 
state is thus easily attributed to a global finance capital working according 
to a global plan and setting up a form of universal governance through the 
interaction of different transnational agencies (such as IMF, WTO, etc.), 
assumptions that are according to Balibar, „fantastic and utopian“ (Balibar 
2013), and probably not the worst scenario of global interactions, compared 
with more violent, war-like ones.
Neoliberalism itself may be seen as a contingent fact. It is contingent (depen-
dent) on a specific set of historical conditions; it is also contingent (accidental) 
in the sense that there was no historical inevitability in the emergence of such 
conditions. The neoliberal course of action was taken by political decision, 
known as Washington consensus, and it was a decision marked by contin-
gency in the context when the alternative course of action, the continuation 
of the Keynesian type of economic policies, was available (Harvey 2007, Steger 
and Roy 2010). Thus, neoliberalism should not be regarded as an ineluctable 
phenomenon, a corollary of five thousand years of debt and violence, but one 
that could have happened later, in another epoch or not at all.
Contingency of debt as a normative claim: The contingency of debt as fact is 
significant both in itself and because it may reveal the multifaceted contin-
gency of the normative claims about debt. The empirical evidence that certain 
facts/events are contingent leads to the normative constructions that are 
contingent themselves. Thus, normative claims are of second-order kind of 
contingency. These interlaced contingencies are mutually reinforcing: contin-
gency of facts and events and contingency of the conceptual and normative 
frameworks we develop to make sense of such phenomena cannot be easily 
disentangled from each other; furthermore, they tend to lend certainty and 
determinacy to each other, so that in time, the institutions created to deal 
with arbitrary or contingent events have a propensity for naturalizing and 
essentializing them, for creating necessity and universality.
If debt as a fact is variable and contingent, then the normative claims about 
debt, for example, „one always has to pay his debts“ appears as contingent. 
This does not mean that the requests to pay debts are inadequate or illegiti-
mate, but that their validity is local, dependent on specific circumstances, and 
cannot be derived from a general procedure. In other words, normative claims 
about debt lack universality. The lack of universality of normative claims about 
debt is implicitly assumed by the arguments for rejecting the usurious and 
odious debts of the poor countries. The lack of universality is acknowledged 
153
  NEW PERSPECTIVES ON DEBT AND ECONOMY
by the calls for debt resistance which point to the illegitimacy of some forms 
of debt, such as loans which provide benefit only to creditors, loans that inflict 
social and environmental harm, loans extended to borrowers who cannot 
possibly afford them, and debt related to access to basic necessities or common 
goods, mainly healthcare and education (Ross 2014).
The contingency of debt as a fact should not eliminate the normative claims 
of debt. On the contrary, it can make a more appealing normative notion of 
„contingent debt“, for example, „contingent sovereign debt“ by introducing 
contingent clauses and scenarios in loans contracts (Drelichman and Voth 
2013). Linking the obligation to pay to an indicator of ability to pay (such 
as GDP growth or export prices) could substantially reduce the risk of defaults 
in sovereign debt, allowing the parties to modify repayments in response to 
unforeseen circumstances and contingencies of the world (Drelichman and 
Voth 2013).
Compared with Lazzarato’s approach, Grabber’s arguments, aiming to dis-
mantle the motive „one always has to pay his debts“ as a „flagrant lie“, shows 
the lack of universality and, implicitly, the contingency of the main normative 
claim about debt. However, for an empowering condition of debt resistance, 
the contingency of debt as ground has to be affirmed as well.
Contingency of debt as ground. Graeber and Lazarato posit debt as ground. 
In both approaches, debt grounds and validates the whole intellectual edi-
fice, thus debt has a foundational role for their approaches. The whole idea 
of foundationalism is that justificatory claims in a certain domain terminate 
in a single unified foundation, in some basic beliefs as prima facie justified 
(Fumerton and Hasan 2010). Lazzarato postulates directly debt as the basic 
belief/foundation to construct his approach. For Graeber, debt as an incom-
plete exchange is a second order ground, itself grounded in exchange, which 
is one the three moral grounds of economic relations – communism, hierarchy 
and exchange. However, in the whole expose of the debt’s longue durée, debt 
takes the role of the determinant ground.
Preoccupation with foundations was considered a form of oppression that 
limits human possibilities, and hampers the human creative potential (Rorty 
1989). The critique and deconstruction of foundations showed that society 
cannot be grounded, and never will be, in a solid foundation, essence or centre. 
The most direct stance of critique of foundations is the antifundationalist 
position, meaning „no foundations“. In political theory especially, anti-
foundationalism considers foundations a threat to otherness, particularity 
and individuality, and therefore, emancipation can occur only by resisting 
foundational claims (Marchart 2007 11–13). However, as Judith Butler 
pointed out, we cannot easily get rid of the notion of foundation, because we 
need to start thinking from somewhere, Thus, Butler argues that the point is 
not to do away with foundations or to be a champion of anti-foundationalism: 
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„Rather, the task is to interrogate what the theoretical move that establishes 
foundations authorizes, and what precisely it excludes or forecloses“ (Butler 
1992: 7). This is a call to examine the conditions of possibility of foundations. 
Thus, what is problematic is not the existence of foundations in the plural, 
but their condition of possibility or ontological status, which is seen now as 
„necessarily contingent“ (Marchart 2007:15). The concept of „necessary 
contingency“ of grounds means that society is always constituted in the 
eternal move between attempts at some form of grounding and the failure of 
such efforts due to the radical contingency underlying all experiences (Marchart 
2007). In other words, the necessary contingency of grounds stands for the 
empty place of final absolute ground. The necessary absence or the empty 
place of the ultimate ground makes possible the plurality of grounds, which 
will attempt to fill it. Necessarily, each foundational attempt must fail to 
posit itself as the ultimate ground (Marchart 2007). In order for a ground to 
fail in occupying the place of the absolute final ground, it has to be posited 
both as „fundamental and contestable“ (White 2000:6). Thus, all funda-
mental conceptualisation of the self, other and world are contestable, and 
nevertheless these conceptualisations are necessary for a reflective ethical 
and political life. We have to be in a position to construct foundations, while 
accepting that they are contestable (White 2000: 6–8).
Therefore, when debt is posited as foundation of society, of the human socia-
bility and interaction, it has to be taken as contestable, as one possible ground 
within a plurality of grounds. The intention of posting debt as ground in 
whatever context might not be radically different from the intention that 
Graeber attributes to Nietzsche – „to shock the bourgeois audience“. Graeber’s 
and Lazzarto’s implicit aim of thinking through debt is similar: to „shock“ and 
„shake“ the audience, showing the chains of debt slavery and, in effect, to 
break the chains of debt. However, as a side effect, thinking through debt as 
ground of the social leads to a philosophical and anthropological overdeter-
mination of debt, which is more difficult to shake/to resist. As well, a theo-
retical construction built on debt as ground ends with a strong edifice of a 
debt economy and neoliberalism, which is more coherent and articulated that 
its sociological or empirical starting point. For example, the figure of subjec-
tivity with which Lazzarato endows the debt-economy and neoliberalism, 
ignores that this subjectivity varies across social formations, geographies and 
class positions and underestimates the „opportunism of capital“, its capacity 
to be relatively indifferent to mentalities and ideologies (Toscano 2014). 
Graeber’s approach, compared with Lazzarto’s, is more aware of contingency 
and of plurality of grounds: it shows that money, market and debt are human 
arrangements and gives considerable insights about manmade nature of the 
market laws. However, the rediscovery of an anthropology of asymmetric 
economic violence functioning rather implacable through centuries and in 
different anthropological context, undermines contingency. In addition, the 
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privileged access to the „real“ but hidden history of market and debt dimin-
ishes contingency and contestability.
Therefore, theoretical weapons for struggle against debt have to acknowledge 
contingency of debt as a fact, normative claim and as ground. Since con-
tingency means that things can be otherwise than they are, it reveals other 
alternatives to be taken into consideration, and allows the critique of the 
current order and given meanings. In other words, contingency implies and 
enhances contestability, and the contingency of debt is not an exception – it 
implies contestability of debt. By exposing the contingency of the alleged 
unavoidable debt, a contestation and even a critique of the logic of in-
debtedness is made possible. In this way, contestability can reintroduce 
democracy in the undemocratic configurations of debt. Because debt limits 
democratic participation and decision-making, the struggle against debt 
has to rescue democracy from debt, and the first step is the democratic 
contestation of debt.
Thus, in order to enhance the conditions of debt resistance and to offer 
theoretical weapons for an agency of resistance, the approaches of debt 
require some precautions against naturalisation and reification of debt. This 
metho dological adjustment is less demanding than postulating an over-
whelming subjectivity of debt, and then to call for conversion to debt free 
subjectivity. Although apparently debt works to eliminate contingency, in-
determinacy, open temporality, possibilities of choice and existential risks, 
debt might be only a „symptom of a persistent cultural incapacity to ac-
knowledge finitude“ (Weber 2013). The appropriate task for critique of the 
logic of debt and indebtedness is to show that it is nevertheless compatible 
with historicity, finitude and contingency. If theoretical conceptualisations 
can prefigure practical insight and possibilities for action, then theorising 
debt should fold back upon itself, disrupting its own unity, and in this way 
enacting its contestability. In addition to exposing the real but hidden history 
of debt in a new grand narrative, with the hope that these will lead to some 
radical forms of transgression and rebellion against debt, and apart from 
the call to conversion to a debt-free subjectivity and second innocence, our 
theoretical endeavours have to acknowledge the contingency of debt and of 
debt related economic practices.
In place of conclusion
The contingency of debt opens up the possibility of its contestation and 
transformation. Contingency reclaims inventiveness and alternatives in the 
face of implacable determination of debt. Coming back to the question from 
Introduction, we have to clarify now if these transformations and alterna-
tives are beyond the logic of jubilee or within it, and implicitly beyond or 
within capitalism.
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A debt resistance that will lead to universal debt repudiation, of a true clean 
slate for society, which will amount to a final jubilee that will end the need 
of jubilees, and will reconstruct society from the root on an equal basis, has 
not been elaborated in the frameworks proposed by Graeber and Lazzarato. 
The suggested methodological adjustment, that is, to view debt as contingent 
and contestable, as well does not lead to a jubilee that will end the need of 
jubilees. Viewing debt as contingent does not eliminate it entirely: debt 
remains as an alternative among other alternatives. Debt as economic practice 
preceded capitalism, and it is not excluded that debt as an economic practice 
will continue to exist in a form or another in a possible community of non-
industrious poor. Conversely, capitalism as a process of permanent becoming, 
as Lazzarato admits it is, will be always an alternative among the alternatives 
that contingency presupposes and reclaims. In addition, contingency of debt 
as fact and the necessary contingency of debt as ground presuppose and 
reclaim a permanent contestability, otherwise the naturalisation and reification 
of debt will be restored. Permanent contesta bility can make debt compatible 
with democracy, not in the sense of channelling financial flows to all poor, 
both industrious and non-industrious, but through deliberating and contesting 
the debt power and debt economy. So, beyond or within capitalism, contingent 
debt is within democracy.
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Tamara Karaus
Otpor prema dugovima: S one strane ili unutar kapitalizma?
Apstrakt
Em pi rij ski slu ča je vi ot po ra pre ma du go vi ma po ka zu ju da se naj ko he rent ni ji na čin 
ot po ra du go vi ma sa sto ji pre sve ga u stor ni ra nju du go va ili nji ho vom ot pi su. No 
da li je stor ni ra nje du go va, čak i u ma sov nim raz me ra ma, do vo ljan ob lik ot po ra 
pre ma du go vi ma ili ot por tre ba da ima za cilj du blje re struk tu ri ra nje eko nom skog 
si ste ma ko ji je stvo rio za du že nost? Na me ra ovog član ka je da se is pi ta da li je 
mo gu će for mu li sa nje ar gu men ta u pri log ot po ra pre ma du go vi ma usme re nom ka 
fi nan sij skoj eko no mi ji ko ja stva ra du go ve, ume sto ot po ra na kon za du ži va nja, ka da 
se tra ži pra šta nje du go va, nji hov ot pis i stor ni ra nje. Da bi do speo do ta kvog ar gu-
men ta, čla nak naj pre ana li zi ra ar gu ment ot po ra pre ma du go vi ma ko ji je for mu li sao 
Dej vid Gre ber u Dug: Pr vih 5000 go di na i Ma u ri cio La za ra to u Stva ra ju ći za du že nog 
čo ve ka: Esej o neo li ber la nom sta nju, uka zu ju ći na po je di ne za jed nič ke pro tiv reč no sti 
i ne do stat ke u Gre be ro vim i La za ra to vim ar gu men ti ma pre ma ko ji ma su du go vi 
fun da men tal ni i ko ji spu ta va ju ot por pre ma du go vi ma, ume sto da ga ra di ka li zu ju. 
U član ku se tvr di da na gla sak na kon tin gent no sti i spor no sti du go va po ja ča va 
ot por pre ma du go vi ma i ot por neo li be ral nom si ste mu kao ta kvom.
Ključ ne re či: ot por, du go vi, neo li be ra li zam, kon tin gen ci ja, spor nost
